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CRIMINAL LAW
CONFESSIONS OF GUILT- NECESSITY OF ADDITIONAL EVI-
DENCE
The defendant was charged with the offense of petit larceny for
the theft of postage stamps. The second assignment of error on appeal
was that the corpus deficti was not proven at the time the state attempted
to introduce the defendant's extra-judicial confession in evidence. The
state introduced evidence that the stamps were missing and also evi-
dence of the person who purchased the stamps from the defendant that
they were two and three cent stamps. The Court of Appeals for
Franklin county ruled that this was sufficient evidence as to the corpus
deficti to permit the introduction of the alleged confession of the
defendant.'
The general rule, including that in Ohio, as to the admissibility of
confessions is that before the confession can be admitted there must be
some evidence outside the confession which tends to establish the corpus
delicti., The term corpus delicti means that the specific crime charged
has actually been committed by some one, and it is made up of two
elements: First, that a certain result has been produced, as that a man
has died; second, that some one is criminally responsible for the result,
as for the death.' It does not include the means and manner by which
the crime was consummated.4
The courts do not attempt to declare a fixed and fast rule as to the
quantum of extrinsic evidence which must be introduced before the
confession of the accused may be admitted. The case of State v. Ma-
randa' is cited in the principal case as authority on this point. The court
in that case ruled that there need not be proof beyond a reasonable doubt
or even a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant but that there
must be some proof tending to establish the fact that a crime was com-
mitted. A lower court case ruled that the proof of the discovery of a
railroad car broken open and that the goods had been taken therefrom
was sufficient proof of the corpus deicti to render admissible an extra-
judicial confession of one that he had burglarized the car.'
The court in the Maranda case pointed out that the rule as to the
corpus deficti was born out of great caution by the courts, in considera-
'State v. Schroyer, 66 Ohio App. 30, 3 N.E. (z) 469 ('94.).
'Blackburn v. State of Ohio, 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
a State v. Kindle, 71 Montana 58, 63, zz7 P. 6S, 67 (1924).
'State of Ohio v. Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380, 7z N.E. 705 (1904).5 94. Ohio St. 364, 114 N.E. 1038 (1904).
' Marconi v. State, 13 Ohio L. Abs. 196 (1932).
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tion of certain cases of homicide wherein it had turned out that by
reason of a failure of the prosecutor to prove the death of the person
charged as having been murdered, it so happened that such person
sometimes survived the person accused as his murderer.7 The reasoning
in an earlier lower court case was that the rule was based on the danger
incident to convictions of persons charged with crime when no crime
was in fact committed.'
The rule applied in the principal case would not have been effective
if the defendant had either plead guilty or made a confession in open
court. The court in State v. Ferranto9 held that a plea of guilty in a
capital offense should be accepted cautiously and the trial judge should
fully advise the accused of his rights and be satisfied that he acts freely
after being so advised. This illustrates the desire on the part of courts
to protect the defendant but there is no rule requiring that there be
evidence introduced to establish the corpus delicti before the plea of
guilty or the confession in open court will be permitted. It would seem
that the reason usually given for the rule as to admissibility of extra-
judicial confessions would also be present in judicial confessions and
pleas of guilty.'" Although some courts in other states have held that
the rule of the principal case does not obtain where the confession was
that of a misdemeanor, 1 there is no indication that the rule will be
so modified in Ohio. R.L.R.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
RIGHT OF ADOPTED CHILD TO INHERIT THROUGH
ITS ADOPTIVE PARENTS
In an action to determine heirship brought by the administrator of
the estate of Ella Saxby, deceased, where the rival claimants were a
first cousin of the deceased and a designated heir of a brother of the
deceased, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Common Pleas Court in
holding that a designated heir can inherit from but not through the
declarant.' In support of this holding the court in a dictum draws an
analogy to the adoption statute, Ohio G.C. Sec. 10512-19.
'State v. Maranda, 940 Ohio St. 364 at 370, 114 N.E. 1038 (19o6); cited supra
note State v. Wehr, 6 Ohio N.P. 345, 9 Ohio Dec. 4S9 (898).
State of Ohio v. Ferranto, xiz Ohio St. 667, 148 N.E. 36z (1925).
' However on this point see Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 13448-z, which reads: " . . . If
the offense charged is murder and the accused is convicted by confession in open court,
the court shall examine the witnesses, determine the degree of the crime and pronounce
sentence accordingly."
'See 22 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, sec. 839, p. 147Z (1940).
'Southern Ohio Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyer, 66 Ohio App. 136, 31 N.E.
(2d) x6i, 32 Ohio L. Abs. 6z6 (1940).
